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Abstract
Against the backdrop of a UN-brokered transition agreement, in February
2012, the Yemeni President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh relinquished power to his
deputy, who formed a new government which included the opposition.
Unlike uprisings in other Arab countries, in Yemen, elite rivalries revealed
themselves in the uprising of 2011 and shaped its trajectory. Saleh’s rivals
joined the protest movement and took control of it, establishing hierar-
chical relations among the protesters and thus enabling themselves to
exercise censorship. In certain respects, the old regime has endured in
another guise, but the new president, ‘Abd-Rabbu Mansur Hadi, has
begun to dismantle some of its pillars. In the light of a collapsed economy,
a humanitarian crisis, unresolved conflicts in several parts of the country,
political instability and greater U.S. involvement, he faces extraordinary
challenges.
‘Our people will remain present in every institution. Two months have
passed since the creation of this weak government. It won’t be able to build
a thing or put one brick on top of another’. Former President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah
Saleh, March 2012.1
Following several months of protests against his rule, in November
2011 the Yemeni President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh agreed to sign a tran-
sition agreement obliging him to transfer power to his deputy. In spite
1 Associated Press, 15 March 2012.
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of declaring the deal a ‘coup’ and the uprising a ‘charade’2 – after all, he
had won the presidential election of 2006 – he insisted he had given up
power voluntarily in order to spare the ‘blood of Yemenis’.3 Indeed, as
the protest movement beginning in January 2011 grew stronger, Yemen’s
long-serving president, who prides himself on having unified the country
in 1990 was confronted with two choices: 1) crush the uprising causing
the death of hundreds of people and facing an uncertain future thereafter,
or 2) accept a deal that guaranteed him immunity from prosecution. By
not following in the footsteps of his counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt,
nor Libya and Syria, and by announcing that he would remain leader of
the party he had founded in 1982, the General People’s Congress (GPC),
he had chosen a ‘third way’. He had bowed to the inevitable, but departed
with his head unbowed.
Prior to Mubarak’s forced resignation in February 2011, the Yemeni
political elite’s belief in its ability to maintain power was unshaken
(Phillips 2011: 21). Saleh had weathered the storms of three decades.
For example, because of his shrewd manipulation of jihadis, they never
posed a real threat to his rule.4 Anti-regime demonstrations in north-
ern and southern Yemen since 2003 were met with extreme force, and
for almost a decade failed to escalate into nationwide protests. In spite
of being the first ruler on the Arabian Peninsula to have introduced an
embryonic democratic system, Saleh’s government retained key features
of Arab military regimes such as unaccountable security agencies. Saleh
preferred ‘closed-door patrimonial bargaining over inclusive participa-
tory politics’ (Phillips 2011: 12).5 His ‘divide and rule’ strategies served
to maintain a level of disorder paradoxically conducive to ensuring regime
survival rather than state building (Wedeen 2008: 51, 179).6
The botched unification of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) ended in the latter’s
defeat in the war of 1994. Thereafter, reforms were gradually revoked.
Saleh amended the unity constitution by dismantling institutions of joint
2 Personal communication with chief negotiators, 22 March 2012, London.
3 “ ”, www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2012/
02/120213 yemen saleh.shtml.
4 Several jihadis, some of whom had fought the Soviet army in Afghanistan during the
1980s, were incorporated into various security units (Boucek 2010: 12).
5 Quoting Daniel Brumberg and others, Phillips (2008: 34) notes that state-initiated polit-
ical openings can be instrumental in perpetuating authoritarian regimes.
6 Here Wedeen theorizes an argument made earlier by the International Crisis Group
(2002: 14).
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governance and granting himself increasing authority to rule by decree
(Day 2010: 65). In 2009, all political parties agreed to postpone parlia-
mentary elections to initiate a dialogue on reforms of the electoral and
constitutional framework that had hitherto mainly served the GPC’s own
interests. Instead of promoting dialogue, a few months before the upris-
ing the ruling party suggested amendments to the constitution that would
abolish presidential term limits and thus enable Saleh to seek another
term after the end of his present one in 2013. Promises made by him
in 2010 to implement administrative and economic reforms to tackle
growing poverty and declining oil and water resources were not kept
(Phillips 2011: 41). The following year, Muhammad al-Dhurafi, then
assistant deputy minister at the Ministry of Finance, claimed that ‘since
the beginning of the 1970s . . . no new hospitals were built in San‘a other
than private ones. This violates the principles of a nation that is con-
cerned with the well-being of its citizens. The level of unemployment and
poverty probably exceeds that of African nations . . . Saleh’s palace is only
200 meters away from the traffic light junction that is filled with beggars
of all ages. It cannot be said that he is ignorant of the situation’.7
A ‘stabilisation’ project initiated by the ‘Friends of Yemen’ in
2010 attempted to salvage a regime that had lost its legitimacy amongst
the population, but took into account neither political grievances nor
Saleh’s history of broken promises. Modelled on simultaneous revolts in
North Africa, the uprising against Saleh’s regime a year later brought
those grievances into sharp focus. What was more, intra-elite divisions
and rivalries within the powerful Hashid confederation from which the
political elite was recruited had already become apparent during the 2006
presidential elections and Saleh’s war in the northern province of Sa‘da
(2004–2010). These power struggles reverberated in the uprising and
even manifested themselves in violent clashes between republican guards
commanded by Saleh’s son Ahmad and Hashid militia in the spring of
2011. In the elections, Hamid al-Ahmar, a wealthy businessmen whose
father was the paramount shaykh of Hashid and founder of al-Islah,
Yemen’s first ‘Islamist’ party, supported Saleh’s rival candidate.8 In those
years, tensions between the Ahmars and members of Saleh’s family about
the monopolisation of economic assets took on a political dimension.
7 ‘Yemen: The stolen revolution?’ YouTube (http://www.presstv.ir), 14 September 2011.
8 Al-Islah was founded in 1990 as a counterweight to the Yemeni Socialist Party. Divided
internally, it is made up of tribal leaders, businessmen, hard-line Salafi groups, and
religious moderates such as Nobel Laureate Tawakkul Karman.
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According to one of the president’s loyalists, ‘Saleh encouraged and sup-
ported the Ahmars’ entrepreneurial activities in order to keep them away
from politics. He did not realise that Hamid was accumulating money in
order to satisfy his political ambitions in the future’.
In 2009, Saleh was more occupied with outmanoeuvring his rivals than
with the new threat arising from the merging of the Yemeni and Saudi
branches of al-Qaeda (Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula – AQAP). The
military campaign in Sa‘da, ostensibly to weaken the charismatic new
Zaydi-Shi‘i leadership that had emerged in response to aggressive Salafi
missionary activity, turned in its later phase into a theatre for humiliating
Saleh’s key rival, General ‘Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar.9 The general, one of the
biggest landowners in the country who commanded the First Armoured
Division (FAD) until December 2012 and was a prominent member of the
regime’s inner circle, opposed Saleh’s grooming of his eldest son Ahmad
as successor. King ‘Abdullah and Prince Nayif of Saudi Arabia, who had
long been weary of President Saleh, contemplated replacing him with
the general. Subsequently, Saleh had the General’s brigades moved away
from the capital and established new security organizations headed by
his nephews who he believed would back his son. One of the reasons
for rekindling the Sa‘da war in August 2009 was to expose the general’s
poor performance on the battlefield, thus undermining his credibility.
Whenever the general appeared on the point of success, Saleh halted
military operations.10
Renewed warfare might also have forced Hamid al-Ahmar to aban-
don his plan to organize nationwide anti-regime demonstrations to fetter
Saleh’s power.11 Such protests would have been inappropriate at a time
the regime claimed to defend national unity. At that time, Hamid tried
to convince ‘Ali Muhsin to join the opposition.12 However, the general
defected only after he surmised the regime might unravel after the killing
of over forty protesters on 18 March 2011. He exploited the uprising to
launch his opposition to Saleh and to take revenge; by assuming promi-
nent roles as sponsors and protectors of the protesters, he and Hamid
were able to claim the moral high ground.
9 ‘Ali Muhsin, who hails from a humble background in Sanhan, is not related to the
shaykhly al-Ahmar family that belongs to a section of Hashid called al-‘Usaymat. The
Zaydi-Shi‘is are a moderate branch of the Twelver-Shi‘a.
10 Army commander Hamid al-Qusaybi, cited by a government official requesting
anonymity.
11 Wikileaks Sanaa 00001617 002 OF 003.
12 Ibid.
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The Uprising: A View from Within
Inspired by the fall of Ben ‘Ali’s regime, on 15 January 2011, students
and unemployed graduates in Ta‘izz and San‘a took to the streets in
support of the Tunisians, calling for an end to corruption and for eco-
nomic and democratic reforms in their own country.13 Protests quickly
spread to other parts of the country, including Aden where demonstra-
tions in favour of south Yemen’s renewed separation from the north
had taken place since 2007. In response, Saleh proposed constitutional
amendments limiting the number of presidential terms – a move that left
protesters unconvinced. In an attempt to stop the movement from gaining
momentum, a few days later activist and subsequent Nobel Peace Prize
winner Tawakkul Karman, who was leading some of the student protests,
was accused of organizing illegal demonstrations and was detained along
with dozens of other activists.
At an emergency parliamentary session on 2 February, Saleh an-
nounced that he would not ‘extend [his] mandate’ and that he disap-
proved of ‘hereditary rule’.14 However, the next day (‘Day of Rage’),
following calls by the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP – the opposition main
coalition) for ‘million-man marches’ all over the country, 10,000 people
gathered at San‘a University.15 Like in several North African countries,
protesters shouted slogans demanding ‘the end of the regime’. Demonstra-
tions continued until Mubarak’s resignation on 11 February. Thousands
of people went to the streets to celebrate the fall of a second Arab dic-
tator, seeing it as a sign that Saleh might be next. That night, hundreds
of security forces and armed thugs attacked the protesters with knives
and sticks, while police arrested dozens.16 A week thereafter, a group
of students set up tents outside the gate of San‘a University and vowed
not to leave the area. Day by day more people joined, until the place
was transformed into a ‘tent-city’ with thousands of inhabitants: Change
13 Demonstrations may also have been linked to the long history of labour strikes and
protests that began in the South and later extended to the North. In 2008, strikes
by port workers, teachers, labourers, and professors took place in cities throughout
Yemen. In 2011, demands for employment, increased wages, and better work conditions
reinvigorated this labour movement.
14 Time, 2 February 2012. This is an allusion to the accusation made by many Yemenis
that Saleh wanted his son Ahmad to assume power after him.
15 The JMP, founded in 2002, is a coalition of six opposition parties dominated by the
Islah party, seconded by the Socialist Party that used to be the ruling party of the PDRY.
16 http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/11/yemen-pro-government-forces-attack-
demonstrators.
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Square was born.17 With time, the ‘tent city’ covered more than four kilo-
metres strung across the road. Its inhabitants came from different social
and regional backgrounds, including Islamists, socialists, liberals, artists,
judges, academics, women, children, the elderly, the unemployed . . . all
sharing food and qat.18 From one entrance, a sign read ‘Welcome to the
land of liberty’. However, in Change Square and other squares around
the country, Yemenis were not newly discovering the power of acting as
a public (see Tripp, Chapter 6 in this volume). By virtue of its tradition
of civic activism (Carapico 1998), party politics and its daily qat sessions
often involving large numbers of people and intense political delibera-
tion, Yemen’s public sphere has never been depoliticized, nor could it be
entirely controlled by security agents (Wedeen 2008). On the one hand,
collective political activism at the square constituted continuity with other
forms of citizen participation (yet in more potent form). On the other
hand, it promoted novel forms of national solidarities that might change
the terms of Yemeni citizens’ political subjectivities and interaction in the
future.
At the square, social boundaries related to gender, class, and region
were transcended to some degree. Existing gender moralities and local
legal codes were challenged. San‘ani women, who traditionally must nei-
ther be out at night nor talk to unrelated men (except in places such
as universities and offices), slept in (women-only) tents and chewed qat
with men.19 Self-identified tribesmen shared tents with opposing tribes-
men with whom for years they had been locked into cycles of revenge
killings, agreeing on peaceful relations and instructing their tribes not to
revenge their deaths in case they were killed by security forces during
the uprising.20 Networking, awareness-raising activities, debates, semi-
nars, and art exhibitions constituted democratic practice more inclusive
than, say, at qat chews. Literacy classes were held and more than twenty
newspapers were produced and distributed by both professional and
‘citizen journalists’. Prior to the uprising, these activities targeted above
all urban elite or civil society groups, building the foundation of an
17 Many ‘squares’ were created in various cities throughout Yemen. By virtue of the location
of our field research, and the fact that many of the protesters and activists from other
cities congregated in San‘a, we focus on events there.
18 Qat is a mild stimulant chewed by adults.
19 Qat chews are usually gendered.
20 ‘Un tribalisme civilise´’, La Voix du Ye´men, 27 April 2011. http://www.lavoixduyemen
.com/2011/04/27/un-tribalisme-civilise/239.
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inclusive nationwide grass-roots movement that was partially blocked
owing to events following 18 March.
18 March – A Turning Point in the Movement?
On 18 March, after Friday prayers, snipers fired on pro-democracy
protesters at Change Square, causing many deaths. Several government
officials resigned in protest. ‘Friday of Dignity’, as it was referred to later,
was the bloodiest and most violent day witnessed by peaceful protesters
in San‘a, and a turning point in the uprising, changing the scene on the
ground, the players, the decision-makers, and the movement’s direction.
Activists held the government responsible, but Saleh denied his forces
were behind the shooting and court proceedings have been suspended.
Saleh declared a state of emergency, imposed a curfew on ‘armed men
in all cities’21 and fired his entire cabinet. The most important conse-
quence of the shooting was the announcement by General ‘Ali Muhsin
and several senior army commanders of their support for the ‘revolu-
tion’ and the deployment of army units to ‘protect’ the protestors.22 FAD
soldiers surrounded the square and replaced the civilian security. How-
ever, the general did not officially resign, nor was he dismissed from the
army. Nor did he remove Saleh’s portrait from his office – in fact, he
added another one later on. At the square, his joining of the protests
was controversial. Some protesters, who felt vulnerable after the killings,
hailed him and his soldiers as heroes who had vowed to make the square
a sanctuary for peaceful demonstrators. Others took a pragmatic view
arguing that the FAD’s defection created a balance between army fac-
tions and offered protesters more bargaining power. However, others
suspected that the general besieged the square as a form of protection
for his units from possible attacks by the Republican Guards. Some also
thought ‘Ali Muhsin, who has always been a shadowy figure in Yemeni
politics (Phillips 2008: 52), was playing a double game, implying that he
wanted to settle scores with Saleh and pursue his own interests rather
than support the youth’s demands.23 Some of those who contested the
general’s presence at the square, considering him to be part of the regime
21 “Yemen unrest: ‘Dozens killed’ as gunmen target rally”, BBC News, 18 March 2011.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12783585.
22 Ibid.
23 Interview with Hamza al-Kamali, ‘Independent Media Centre’, Change Square, 20
March 2011.
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and a political player seeking to maintain the status quo, left the square.
They were also concerned about a possible military coup by the general.
According to Hamza Al-Kamali, a young protestor, ‘how can a man who
has a bloody past and is responsible for the death of thousands of people,
be moved by the death of only fifty-two? This is surely his way of getting
on the winning team and to save himself’. Indeed, sympathizers of the
Southern Movement24 and the Zaydi-Shi‘i revivalist movement (Huthis)
disapproved of the general’s announcement on the grounds that he had
participated in the war of 1994 that led to the defeat of southern forces
and was in charge of the military campaign in Sa‘da.
Similar discussions took place in the southern provinces, which by the
time the nationwide uprising began had already witnessed four years of
mass opposition to the Saleh regime. When the protests spread to several
cities, many amongst the Southern Movement believed that there was a
real opportunity for change and put aside their calls for secession, hoping
that a new regime would mean justice for the South. However, after
‘Ali Muhsin embraced the protest movement, they became disillusioned;
subsequently, calls for ‘an end to northern occupation’ and separation
intensified.
Another implication of his joining was the gradual militarisation of the
square. Despite the commitment to peaceful resistance, since the arrival of
the FAD, the line between soldiers and protesters became more blurred.
Soldiers were seen entering tents with their Kalashnikovs, something that
was forbidden at the outset of the ‘revolution’. Occasionally, they changed
their uniforms for civilian clothes. At the square, ‘Ali Muhsin recruited
unemployed young men – often under eighteen – for the FAD and Islah-
affiliated militias.
In a newspaper interview, Yahya al-Dhib, the first soldier who defected
from Saleh’s army prior to ‘Ali Muhsin and the FAD, spoke of the negative
effect of the general’s control over the square, especially because he had
been recruiting civilians to fight in his army. He also explained how he
was threatened after refusing orders from ‘Ali Muhsin to use violence
against attackers. ‘They told me that if you want your salary, you have to
hold the weapon and kill whoever assaults the protesters’, adding ‘they
will make us kill each other and they will not care how many of us die’.25
24 The Southern Movement emerged as a result of discontent in the southern provinces
after 1994. Earlier demands for equal citizenship rights and jobs have culminated in
calls for the reinstatement of the PDRY (see Day 2010).
25 ‘Faces from Yemen’s revolution: Yahia al-Dheeb’, Yemen Times, 10 October 2011.
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139236737.016
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. SOAS - University of London, on 07 Jun 2019 at 13:19:34, subject to the Cambridge Core
Yemen 293
In fact, in September and October 2011, attacks by security forces on
protesters soon evolved into clashes between them and the FAD.
Post-18 March: ‘Establishment’ Actors Consolidate their Power
in Change Square
Echoing Filiu (2011: 57), Tripp (Chapter 6 in this volume) highlights the
‘leaderless’ nature of the uprisings of 2011. However, in Yemen’s Change
Square there were powerful actors who aspired to control the protest
movement and did not shy away from the use of force. In spite of declaring
their opposition to Saleh, those men – all members of the regime – began
to exercise authority over the space that had been previously reclaimed by
protesters as part of ‘a counter-hegemonic project of resistance’ (ibid.). As
a self-styled leader of the opposition against Saleh, ‘Ali Muhsin became
a paradoxical figure who maintained his government salary after his
defection. His joining also consolidated the power of his close affiliate,
the Islah party that after the ‘Friday of Dignity’ came to play a crucial
role in determining the protest movement’s direction. At the square, this
raised questions as to whether the uprising was an independent movement
led by ‘youth’ – as it has often been portrayed – or whether it was
dominated by the most powerful opposition party, al-Islah. Thanks to
its access to mosques and party-affiliated NGOs, al-Islah has a large
following. The large presence of unemployed youth at the square has also
helped al-Islah and ‘Ali Muhsin to ‘buy’ loyalties through money and food
distribution.
Al-Islah’s attempt at controlling the square and Hamid Al-Ahmar’s
intention to use his constituency to gain power caused resentment, espe-
cially amongst the younger generation who does not hold memberships of
officially recognised political parties, nor close ties or affiliations (‘inde-
pendents’).26 Those who had spearheaded the protest movement and felt
empowered were disillusioned. As one of the student protesters who had
been amongst those who began the sit-in in front of San‘a University in
February 2011 noted, ‘our tents were not as nice as they are now, we
did not have enough food, and we were not as organized, but we were in
control’. Although lacking experience and funding, they were successful
in forming coalitions with other groups. For example, the Coordination
Council for the Yemeni Revolution for Change (CCYRC), an umbrella
coalition intended to bring together independent groups in squares across
26 Some have been active in politics on an independent basis or in NGOs.
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Yemen, was made up of about seventy groups nationwide. Grass-roots
groups emerged whose numbers steadily increased, taking on different
tasks: medical, security, financial, provision of services, and the establish-
ment of media task forces. However, once well-organized and well-funded
members of the JMP (mainly Islahis) joined the movement, they began
infiltrating the organizing committee that was in control of security and
planning activities. At first, ‘independent’ youth welcomed them because
organizing and coordinating the movement was a priority. Yet, eventu-
ally, Islahi hardliners who had assumed the leadership of many of the
major groups consolidated their power and monopolised decisions. In
an arena where emphasis was placed on freedom and change, the orga-
nizing committee began censoring information and confiscating private
property.
Thus, after 18 March, with the support of the FAD, al-Islah grew
stronger and slowly began monopolising the square’s platform – the
centre of media broadcasting and live coverage – and decision-making
processes.27 Consequently, independent groups became marginalized,
unable to express their own opinions – their choices were to stay quiet, to
suffer abuse, or to leave the square. The Islah party and the independent
youth were caught in a tug of war, with leading activists chanting,
‘No partisan politics, no political parties. Our revolution is a Youth
Revolution’.
Independent groups repudiated accusations that they were controlled
by either al-Islah or more generally the JMP. They often used these two
terms interchangeably, highlighting the hegemony of al-Islah over other
parties (of the JMP) as exemplified by their control over political decision-
making. Many argued, since the other JMP parties remained in the coali-
tion even after many abuses were committed against activists, that they
were complicit in the crimes. As one protester asked, ‘while it is al-Islah
hardliners who commit the crimes, why are the other parties still partners
in the coalition even though they are also targets?’
Islah’s control over the square often led independent activists to defy
its decisions in order to demonstrate that it does not control ‘the street’.
Feeling excluded and resentful, on various occasions they and others
organized their own marches without the approval of the organizing
committee – only to experience violence from Islahi hardliners and ‘Ali
Muhsin’s soldiers. Following protesters’ complaints about the organizing
committee’s policies, its members were replaced, but maltreatment of
protesters did not stop.
27 Controlling the square, of course, means controlling the outgoing messages.
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After Saleh’s speech about inappropriate mixing of men and women
protesters, a cross-gender march was planned in protest at his remarks.
The organizing committee was concerned to ‘prove’ that women did not
fraternize with men at the square. Some of those who marched jointly that
day were beaten by committee members and FAD soldiers – those who
had vowed to protect the protesters. Defying the committee’s orders, on
another occasion independent protesters marched to (the then Vice Pres-
ident) ‘Abd-Rabbu Mansur Hadi’s house and were met with batons and
gun shots in the air, and some were detained once again. Al-Islah’s and ‘Ali
Muhsin’s authority manifested itself not least in the prisons run by them –
the cliche´d hallmark of Foucault’s disciplined subject – where recalcitrant
youth were taken. The rationale given for operating private jails at the
square (and new ones established by ‘Ali Muhsin, found in various public
institutions) was to ‘detain thugs who attacked peaceful protesters’. The
organizing committee often detained independent protesters on the false
premise that they were ‘thugs’, and soon these prisons became populated
with people who had been too vocal against the decisions of either al-
Islah or ‘Ali Muhsin. Protesters were to defy state power, but not theirs.
Human rights organizations were not allowed to visit the prisoners who
claimed to have been repeatedly beaten. ‘There are many methods they
use to impose their decisions, such as [offering] food in return for loyalty,
making accusations that someone is a government spy, or detaining peo-
ple as happened to me’ said Nasir al-‘Ujaybi, an independent protester
and member of the CCYRC. Independent protesters and groups opposed
to al-Islah’s or ‘Ali Muhsin’s practices in the square were also faced with
smear campaigns via Facebook and the Suhayl television channel owned
by Hamid al-Ahmar.
Although the JMP – especially al-Islah – was criticised by ‘indepen-
dents’ over these violations, it was able to deny responsibility because
of the clever distance it created between them and other groups in the
square. For example, the organizing committee did not officially carry
al-Islah’s name, and many of its members were not affiliated to the party.
However, a closer look into the group’s composition reveals that the
decision-makers were members of al-Islah and often received direct orders
from top party leaders. Similarly, many other groups who claimed to be
independent were in fact affiliated to the party. This has allowed them
to control the square and simultaneously evade responsibility when the
organizing committee is accused of violations, giving it the opportunity
to play both sides.
Moreover, some leading Islah civil society members remained quiet
even while abuse occurred, often questioning the truth behind such
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accusations. Amongst them was Tawakkul Karman, chairwoman of the
NGO ‘Women Journalists without Chains’ who had already organized
protests several years before the uprising began. Jointly with other mem-
bers of civil society groups, she demonstrated weekly in favour of the right
to freedom of expression and an end to corruption. Karman, who prefers
to be known as a youth activist rather than a member of al-Islah’s advisory
council, exemplifies the double game played by her party; members of the
party – including ‘Ali Muhsin, who has ties to it – secured leading roles in
both camps. In the early days of the ‘revolution’, Karman’s decisions often
varied from the politics of her party. Occasionally, she was at odds with
its leadership, most notably on 11 May 2011, when she decided to march
without the approval of the organizing committee. Thereafter, however,
Karman’s political decisions were in line with Islah’s. For example, in
a BBC interview after Saleh’s signing of the transition agreement, she
declared her opposition to the initiative and the forthcoming election. ‘If
there is only one consensus candidate where is the people’s choice then?’
she asked. ‘This is a conspiracy against the Yemeni people, and against
the revolution. It means nothing to us, and has nothing to do with us. We
reject it wholeheartedly’.28 Her party, however, asked its members and
followers to take part in the election. A month before the election, Karman
publicly declared her loyalty to the political process and encouraged peo-
ple to vote, stating on the day of the election, ‘this [election] is the success-
ful product of the people’s struggle’.29 In response to a post on Facebook
where a man wondered about her change of mind regarding the election,
suggesting that her and her party’s main goal was to gain seats in the new
government, Karman responded ‘if we look at the statistics of the martyrs
and the wounded, we see that the largest share goes to the Islah party.
You cannot find a single martyr from the Huthis [adherents of the Zaydi
revivalist movement] and very few from the armed Southern Movement.
They cry about the wounded and the martyrs but left them [protesters
associated with al-Islah] alone to fight ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Saleh’s regime’.30
By highlighting Islah’s sacrifices and dismissing those made by others
who had fought Saleh’s regime, Karman made claims in the name of
her party to the ownership of the ‘revolution’, and underscored rivalries
and fault lines within the opposition, which has become more sharply
28 http://youtu.be/VVD OiDiJaY. Karman had herself planned to contest the elections.
29 http://youtu.be/omQeVZ7TBB8.
30 Her statement was met with indignation amongst members of the Southern Movement
and the Huthis whose uprising claimed as many victims as Syria’s between March
2011 and June 2012, most of them non-combatants.
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polarised. In Change Square, members of the Islah party tried to burn
tents set up by the Southern Movement (Hirak). After 18 March peaceful
coexistence amongst Islahis and Huthis gradually gave way to collision,
reflecting tensions and armed conflict between them in the northern
provinces. These different sides are clearly demarcated by the slogans
and posters that decorate their tents, dividing the square into a northern
and southern part, with independent groups in the central area often
mockingly calling the square ‘north and south Beirut’. In June 2012,
Islah hardliners for the first time chanted ‘No to Huthis, our revolution
is the revolution of the Ikhwan (Muslim Brothers)’. Thus, Islah indicated
its unwillingness to eschew partisan politics, but none the less subscribed
to political dialogue. Its general secretary, ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Anisi, was
a member of an ‘outreach committee’ that discussed the Huthis’ partici-
pation in the national dialogue with their leadership in Sa‘da in February
2012.
Islah’s double game continued even after the signing of the power-
sharing agreement. As part of the JMP, Islah signed it and joined the
transitional government (as will be discussed), but by May 2012, its
members were still at the square shouting revolutionary slogans against
the agreement. This led many younger members of al-Islah and other
parties to leave them, sometimes joining new groups such as al-Watan
(‘Homeland’), made up of emerging youth leaders and businessmen; the
Justice and Development party, headed by Muhammad Abu Luhum, a
former GPC member; and the Yemeni Labour Party, the first party created
by and for a stigmatised group who is attributed to East African descent
and often referred to by the derogatory term ‘al-Akhdam’. The first Salafi-
affiliated al-Rashad party was also established. Moreover, because it
joined the new government, al-Islah sought ascendancy within the JMP,
which is unlikely to remain a united opposition against the new president.
As for the GPC, at the time of this writing, several of its members wish to
reform the party and envisage a coalition with the Yemeni Socialist Party
(YSP) and the Huthis against al-Islah.
A Negotiated Transition
The Yemeni uprising alarmed both the Saudi and American governments
because of its potential for stirring up revolts in neighbouring Gulf coun-
tries, for backtracking on and jeopardising U.S. counterterrorism policy
and, after ‘Ali Muhsin’s defection, for descending into violence. Dur-
ing the early phase of the uprising, U.S. and EU officials were already
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discouraging Yemeni activists from continuing their protests.31 In April,
efforts were made to contain ‘the revolution’ by ousting the man at the
regime’s apex without altering its fundamental structure. To this end,
an agreement was drafted in consultation with Saleh’s advisor ‘Abd al-
Karim al-Iryani and others. It was Saleh’s idea to involve the GCC, and
subsequently the draft agreement was adopted by the secretary general
of the GCC, ‘Abd al-Latif al-Zayani. Like other GGC countries, at that
time Saudi Arabia was opposed to Saleh’s departure and played no role in
the drafting of the agreement. (Qatar made a few minor amendments but
later withdrew from the mediation process.) According to one political
observer, ‘there was a fatwa from Riyadh [that is, an endorsement of the
initiative], but it was a GCC initiative without the GCC’. The agreement,
which during its initial phase was not based on negotiations between the
GPC and JMP, was presented to Saudi Arabia only a few hours before
the signing ceremony. Calculating that it might not win fresh elections,
Islah was hesitant at first but decided to support the agreement because
it wanted to see Saleh squeezed out of office. What came to be known as
the ‘GCC initiative’ centred on the formation of a government under the
leadership of an opposition candidate and on demands that demonstra-
tions end and public spaces be evacuated.32 Following his resignation,
the president was to be granted immunity from prosecution, a measure
rejected by human rights groups and ‘revolutionary youth’ who insisted
that he be held accountable for the killing of protesters.33 The draft agree-
ment is pursuant to several basic principles such as the preservation of
Yemen’s unity, security, and stability; the fulfilment of the Yemeni peo-
ple’s aspiration for change and reform; and a transfer of power based
on national consensus. It stipulates that a national unity government will
be formed with equal representation from the GPC and the opposition
parties, and that the vice president will become the legitimate president
thirty days after the agreement. Terms such as ‘democracy’, ‘national dia-
logue’, ‘women’, and ‘youth’ do not appear in the initial GCC document
of April.
After Ansar al-Shari‘a (Partisans of Shari‘a), an affiliate of AQAP, had
gained control of two cities in southern Yemen and had come close to
Aden and the Arabian Sea in July 2011, the United States insisted on an
31 New Yorker, 11 April 2011.
32 http://www.yobserver.com, 23 April 2011.
33 ‘Yemen: Deadly attacks follow Saleh immunity pact’, Human Rights Watch, 28 April
2011.
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immediate transition of power. Political analysts suspect that Saleh, keen
to raise fears that the militants would expand their operations were he
to step down, allowed the militants some leverage. However, the United
States, which still supported Saleh’s regime even when it had become the
main threat to national stability, seem to have interpreted their territorial
gains as demonstrating the regime’s inability to protect their interests in
a country of geostrategic importance.34
Although Saleh had agreed to the GCC proposal, he declined to sign the
agreement for several months – presumably, he resented the prospect that
his rivals would celebrate his resignation as their victory and feared that
power might fall into their hands. Consequently, he pledged to step down
on behalf of the youth movement rather than the JMP (Filiu 2011: 68).
In November 2011, Saleh was persuaded by UN envoy Jamal Benomar
to sign the second agreement. Saleh wanted neither to suffer Qaddafi’s
fate nor have his assets frozen. The November agreement, which unlike
the first one, was based on UN-led negotiations between Saleh and the
opposition, reflects the UN’s concern that the political process be partici-
patory and inclusive. It calls for early presidential elections within ninety
days and the formation of a government of national unity, stipulating
that the first phase of the transition period shall end with the inaugura-
tion of the new president (this has been completed). The second phase
is to last for two years – which includes the time of this writing – and
is to end with the holding of general elections in accordance with a new
constitution. The agreement – essentially a compromise between elites –
places emphasis on human rights and good governance. It calls for the
establishment of a committee on military affairs for achieving security
and stability and a conference for national dialogue focussing on changes
to the constitution and national reconciliation. It is to include all political
actors, amongst them ‘revolutionary youth’, the Southern Movement, the
Huthis, civil society, and women representatives. After the signing of the
agreement, different members of the Security Council ‘volunteered’ to
take on complementary advisory roles: Russia dealing with the national
dialogue committee, France with constitutional reform, the United States
with restructuring the army, and Britain – in liaison with EU partners –
with the security and justice sector.
34 For some time, Saleh’s strategy had worked: in 2010, the United States spent $176 million
on training and other military assistance (Washington Post, 16 May 2012), and King
‘Abdullah granted him $700 million (New York Times, 17 March 2012).
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139236737.016
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. SOAS - University of London, on 07 Jun 2019 at 13:19:34, subject to the Cambridge Core
300 Gabriele vom Bruck, Atiaf Alwazir and Benjamin Wiacek
A presidential election was held on February 21, 2012. ‘Abd-Rabbu
Mansur Hadi, a consensus figure, was the only candidate.35 Ordinary
Yemenis hoped that the election – in reality a referendum and a sym-
bolic act sealing Saleh’s exit from power – would end the ‘paralysis’
(a term they often used) of previous months. The new Prime Minister
Muhammad Basindwa, tasked to form a government of national unity,
was nominated by the opposition. Half of the coalition government is
composed of members of the GPC that is still headed by the former pres-
ident. He has become the e´minence grise who has not ceased interfering
in government affairs. Key portfolios such as foreign affairs and defence
are still in the hands of his party. Like Hadi, the minister of defence
General Muhammad Nasir Ahmad ‘Ali hails from Abyan province (south-
ern Yemen) and moved to the YAR in 1986. One of the shortcomings
of the GCC agreement is that key members of the political elite, some of
whom have attempted to stifle the political process, have not been asked to
leave the country temporarily, in spite of agreeing with this proposal (the
GCC objected). The power struggle within the elite – beginning before
and during the uprising – has been carried into the new, post-Saleh era.
Even though its members belong to various political parties, their conflict
is driven by interest rather than ideology.
In addition to constitutional legality, Hadi enjoys the backing of the
‘international community’ and of ‘Ali Muhsin, and has started to disman-
tle some of the old regime’s pillars and to assert his authority. (This has
been one of the ‘revolutionary youth’s’ demands.) However, he has yet to
demonstrate his ability to build a broad base of support within Yemeni
society. In an effort to reduce southerners’ alienation from the central
government and indeed from himself (since he helped to defeat southern
forces in 1994), he replaced Aden’s governor and police chief as well
as the commander of the southern region, Mahdi Maqwala, who stands
accused of having collaborated with AQAP-affiliated elements in order
to make the region ungovernable and of having illegally appropriated
land in the south for personal gains. Hadi also replaced the governors of
five provinces and nearly twenty military commanders who were loyal to
35 Hadi, trained at Sandhurst and in Egypt and Russia, rose in the military ranks of
the PDRY. Following clashes within the ruling party in 1986, Hadi – along with his
battalions – fled to the North joining ‘Ali Nasir Muhammad (former PDRY prime
minister) and became one of Saleh’s advisors. Having dealt the southern separatist
forces a decisive blow in the war of 1994, Hadi was given the defence portfolio and vice
presidency. His appointment also allowed Saleh to rebut accusations that his government
was dominated by the (northern) victors.
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Saleh. He began to establish his own power base and – during the early
months of his rule – to redress the balance between North and South in
the military and security institutions. However, more recently, sustained
recruitment of army and security personnel from Abyan and Shabwa has
raised suspicion that he will build another, different patronage system
rather than a supra-regional professional army. Former PDRY governor
of Abyan Muhammad ‘Ali Ahmad has returned from his exile in Britain
and now supports Hadi against another PDRY veteran politician, ‘Ali
Salim al-Bidh, who advocates Yemen’s renewed partition. Some of the
governors Hadi appointed hail from the provinces they govern, amongst
them those in charge of Abyan, Aden, and Ta‘izz. This policy, which
might help to heal divisions, constitutes a delicate balancing act because
regional affiliation in the distribution of power has been a contentious
issue for centuries. However, his more recent appointment of several
Islahi governors in the northern provinces (in September 2012), which
reflects the strong influence of the Islah party on his government, has
exacerbated the violence there.
Some of Saleh’s relatives and loyalists who were dismissed from their
posts were defiant and even mutinous. Saleh’s half-brother Muhammad
Saleh al-Ahmar laid siege to San‘a airport, forcing its closure after threat-
ening to shoot down planes.36 The transfer of the Third Brigade – an
advanced military unit of the Republican Guard stationed on a mountain
overlooking the presidential palace – from Saleh’s nephew Tariq to ‘Abd
al-Rahman al-Halili, a friend of ‘Ali Muhsin, carried more than sym-
bolic weight; the brigade included about 200 tanks and was in charge of
protecting the capital from all directions.37 Several months after his inau-
guration, Hadi had not removed any high profile allies of ‘Ali Muhsin.
The officer corps was still Sanhani38 and a number of Saleh’s loyalists
remained in their posts. Rather than calling off the military parade for
the twenty-second anniversary of Yemen’s unification after the murder
of ninety-six cadets who had been rehearsing for the event the previous
day, Hadi had it moved from Sab‘in Square (where parades took place
during Saleh’s era) to the Aviation Academy located in a part of the city
36 Agence France-Presse, 3 May 2012. Subsequently in June, the UN Security Council
approved a resolution threatening non-military sanctions against anyone who obstructs
the implementation of the GCC initiative and its mechanism (Washington Post, 12 June
2012).
37 Ibid.
38 Members of Hashid’s sub-section Sanhan from which most of the regime’s inner circle
was recruited (see note 9).
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controlled by ‘Ali Muhsin,39 thus preventing this provocative act from
undermining his authority.
The dismissal of Saleh’s nephews left his son Ahmad more vulnerable.
Given the bold steps Hadi has taken, since 2013 his political survival
has no longer depended on maintaining a balance of power between
Saleh’s relatives on the one hand and ‘Ali Muhsin (who maintained his
independent power base until December 2012) on the other hand. By
June 2012, Hadi had gained considerable popular support even amongst
some ‘revolutionary youth’ who had argued that the GCC agreement
had ‘hijacked the revolution’. The reshuffle pursued by Hadi may yet
provoke a coup by remnants of Saleh’s inner circle who resent losing
power and suspect that the dismissal of their peers will strengthen their
rivals’ position; or by opposition figures who seek power and are con-
cerned that men linked to the South’s old political elite encroach on their
status. Some key political brokers might be inclined to hinder substan-
tial changes to the status quo unless their interests are well served. They
may be disinclined to acquiesce in the dialogue’s Technical Committee’s
recommendation to Hadi to return all properties and funds appropri-
ated, as a kind of booty, after the war of 1994. ‘Ali Muhsin, who has
protected Hadi since 1986 and has declared his loyalty to him, might
well abstain from obstructing the unification of the army and be content
with taking up the position he held in the old regime prior to the dis-
cord between him and Saleh. Tribal leaders have been mediating between
them trying to minimise the rift. Several leaders of the Hashid and Bakil
confederations, amongst others, feel alienated by Hadi’s personal style
and by the number of southerners who have been appointed to key posi-
tions in the government and the army. They complain that Saleh was
more readily available for personal consultation. Political rumours and
speculation abound; this has led some government officials to recall Pres-
ident Ibrahim al-Hamdi’s fate whose rule came to a sudden end after he
ousted several important tribal leaders from their posts.40 A number of
attempts on politicians’ lives, amongst them Yasin Nu‘man, leader of the
Socialist party, and Minister of Defence Muhammad Nasir Ahmad ‘Ali
(third attempt on 11 September 2012) invoked fearful memories amongst
Yemenis.41
39 Al-Quds al-‘Arabi, 23 May 2012.
40 Al-Hamdi ruled from 1974–1977.
41 Between mid-2011 and November 2012, at least fifty-five military and security officials
had been killed (Associated Press, 7 November 2012).
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Hadi’s Challenges
Three months after Hadi’s inauguration, Jamal Benomar noted that
the transition was taking place ‘against a backdrop of serious security
concerns, an unprecedented humanitarian crisis and many unresolved
conflicts’.42 Hadi’s credibility will depend in part on his ability to rescue
the collapsing economy, to create jobs, and to restore political stability
so that the national dialogue can be brought to fruition.43 Unlike his
predecessors, he cannot rely on the 1962 revolution as a source of legit-
imacy, and his record does not help – during the period he served as
vice president, living conditions were only fractionally better than those
experienced under the ousted Hamid al-Din dynasty.
One of Saleh’s burdensome legacies is the re-energised AQAP. Out-
fits such as Ansar al-Shari‘a have failed to benefit from the turmoil in
Arab countries – except in Yemen. Hadi is concerned to prove that he is
capable of establishing a government that will have sovereignty over its
territory and of fighting AQAP. His first statement following his election
emphasized his willingness to do so. In March 2012, Ansar al-Shari‘a
took control of a district in Shabwa (on Yemen’s south-eastern coast-
line) where the country’s largest liquid natural gas plant operates, and of
al-Briga, where Yemen’s major oil refinery is located.44 By June, Ansar
al-Shari‘a was driven out of southern cities such as Jaar and Zinjibar.45
The recapture of cities in Abyan – Hadi’s home province – is, of course,
symbolically significant.
In 2011, divisions within the army brought the country to the brink
of civil war. They have continued to stifle the political process. There-
fore, one of Hadi’s greatest challenges is to reorganize and unite the
army under a single command. As a first step, Hadi established a new
military unit composed of elements from the military police, the Central
Security Forces, the Republican Guard, and the First Armoured Division.
This move has helped eliminate the capital’s division of several zones
of rival control.46 By helping to revamp the army, the United States is
likely to gain more leverage over the Yemeni leadership and to orient it
42 http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnews.asp?nid=42109.
43 There is up to 70 per cent unemployment amongst Yemen’s youth (Financial Times, 27
March 2012). A month after his election, Hadi announced the creation of 60,000 new
jobs, raising the salaries of civil servants and medical treatment for those wounded in
the uprising (Yemen Times, 25 March 2012).
44 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 13 March 2012.
45 Reuters, 9 June 2012.
46 Ginny Hill, ‘Yemen’s presidential gambit’, Foreign Policy, 16 May 2012.
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more strongly towards counterterrorism operations. The United States
envisages ‘developing interoperable and integrated approaches’ in liaison
with GCC countries.47 Given Saudi Arabia’s incompetent army and its
disgruntlement at losing an ally, Hosni Mubarak, whose forces might
have contributed to fighting its enemies in future conflicts, such a vision
is of great significance, indicating that the United States is already re-
thinking the Middle East’s military structure within the framework of the
US-GCC strategic alliance. The Saudi-owned Al-Sharq al-Awsat (15 May
2012) noted that ‘Yemen is considered the geo-strategic extension of the
GCC countries’ security’. Al-Hayat (3 August 2012) went as far as to sug-
gest that Yemen was likely to join the regional and international alliance
against Iran.
The United States has taken advantage of the turmoil to increase
its influence and the scope of its military operations in Yemen. It has
increased the number of CIA operatives and Special Forces, has taken
over the former Soviet air force base in al-Anad, and begun to send mil-
itary aircraft to Yemen. Fourteen out of thirty-one drone attacks carried
out in Yemen since 2002 have occurred in 2012, and Yemeni troops
fighting in the south receive direct help from U.S. forces.48 However,
the United States’s counterterrorism policy might undermine the care-
taker government that in order to gain legitimacy needs to be perceived
as independent by Yemeni citizens. As for Yemen’s powerful northern
neighbour, the obstruction of democracy and independence in Yemen
will remain part of its foreign policy agenda. Unwilling to tolerate the
emergence of an alternative leadership from the youth ‘revolutionary
movement’, it has acquiesced in Hadi’s presidency. Against the backdrop
of Yemen’s fragile economy and volatile political situation, Saudi Arabia
is likely to maintain and even enlarge its patronage network there. Hadi,
who will depend on Saudi Arabian largesse, will not be able to prevent
it from meddling in Yemen’s affairs. A GCC-sponsored conference held
in Riyadh in January 2013 by Hadrami-born politicians and merchants
calling for a GCC-affiliated independent Hadramaut has renewed fears
amongst Yemenis that Saudi Arabia might still seek to annex it in order
to gain access to the Indian Ocean.
Hadi is aware that failure of the national dialogue might lead to
renewed violence and to Yemen’s fragmentation. The political stalemate
47 Gerald Feierstein cited in http://yemen24news.blogspot.com/2012/02.
48 Economist, 12 May 2012; Washington Times, 17 May 2012; Los Angeles Times, 21
June 2012. The Long War Journal (13 June 2012) reports forty air strikes since 2002.
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during Saleh’s rule was linked partly to the fact that the ‘responsible
national dialogue . . . among the full political spectrum’ (Phillips 2011:
41) he had called for never took place. As noted by the UN envoy to
Yemen, ‘the success or failure of the national dialogue is likely to make
or break Yemen’s transition’.49 In March 2012, a preliminary meeting
took place in Potsdam to explore the possibility of an inclusive dialogue.
In May, Hadi formed a committee charged with contacting different
political representatives; above all, those not yet represented in the polit-
ical process, such as the Huthis and followers of ‘Ali al-Bidh.50 In June,
talks were held in Cairo with southern leaders, amongst them ‘Ali Nasir
Muhammad and Haydar al-‘Attas. Attempting to discourage the south-
ern provinces from seeking secession, one of the dialogue’s central goals
is regional de´tente. Questions about sovereignty – centralised union or
decentralised federation – will have to be tackled, and Yemenis will have
to decide whether to choose a presidential or parliamentary system of
governance. A federal constitutional system would allow those provinces
that are no longer under the government’s control to be incorporated. The
outcome of the dialogue will feed into the constitution-making process
that is to conclude in 2013.
Conclusion
Compared to the other uprisings dealt with in this volume, that in Yemen
is unprecedented. A prominent member of the governing elite, but with
no dynastic ties to the former leader and who came to power via a deal
rather than a coup, has begun to unseat members of the old regime.51
Saleh has been the only ousted leader granted immunity from prosecution
and remains in charge of the former ruling party. Until well into the
twenty-first century, Saleh used to label his adversaries ‘enemies of the
revolution’, thus linking his rule to the 1962 revolution and claiming
that it had come to fruition in him. Cognisant of the dramatic events of
2011–12, many of his fellow citizens might feel that revolution in their
country is indeed a long-term project. Did Hadi, by ordering that parts of
49 See note 42.
50 Because of the GCC agreement’s provision to include only members of established
political parties in the new government, significant groups such as the Huthis were given
neither cabinet posts nor governorships. Thus, an opportunity was missed to integrate
them into the political process and to weaken their role as a militia.
51 Note in this context that Hadi became a member by default – he was an opportunist
rather than a regime loyalist.
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Change Square be cleared, declare it complete? Several months thereafter,
there were still many tents left in the square; for some time, Karman even
moved her family and secretary to hers.52
The negotiation of the power-sharing agreement as well as the forth-
coming national dialogue constitute democratic practice even while insti-
tutionalized; procedural democracy – a key demand of the protesters – is
unlikely to be established any time soon. The impetus towards political
change came from the protesters, but it was the joint effort of Yemeni
politicians, foreign powers, and the UN who brought about Saleh’s resig-
nation. According to one Yemeni analyst, ‘the protesters were the spark
but not the fire’. In accordance with the transition agreement, power has
passed between elites to the exclusion of the ‘revolutionary youth’. The
agreement constitutes a fragile equilibrium of sorts. It is hoped that it will
not come under strain like that between the GPC and YSP in the early
1990s that ended in armed confrontation. The regime has been reframed
but not undone, thanks partly to the split within Hashid. ‘Ali Muhsin’s
desertion made Saleh vulnerable but also safeguarded the stake of the
Sanhanis – not least because he also prevented Hamid al-Ahmar from
monopolising the revolutionary stage.
Irrespective of what the ‘revolution’ may or may not have achieved,53
the effects of public-sphere joint activism are likely to be lasting and
productive of new political subjectivities. As political analyst ‘Abd al-
Ghani al-Iryani declared enthusiastically, ‘the election provided a political
opening – a shift of power from the tribal north to a democratic centre.
Yemeni subjects have become Yemeni citizens’.54 However, at Change
Square, people’s sense of empowerment alternated with disappointment.
As it was put by a businessman whose young nephew was still going
to the square in May 2012, ‘in the future he will insist on his right to
demonstrate. He has learnt to distinguish between people who want real
change and those who want power, and that “the street” can change
things. He first felt empowered and then disillusioned, but that doesn’t
matter’.
Protesters’ demands for democratic reform have been overshadowed
by a power struggle within the elite that climaxed in 2011 and might
yet haunt the new government. The militarisation of Change Square
52 The Organizing Committee of the Youth Revolution decided to dismantle the tents in
April 2013, a month after the start of the National Dialogue.
53 Space does not permit us to examine whether indeed another “revolution” has occurred.
54 Interview, 2 May 2012.
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undermined the experience of solidarity, which was starting to transcend
familiar divide-and-rule strategies. Self-styled ‘revolutionary’ leaders
purporting to protect the lives of the protesters and to provide guid-
ance also exercised censorship, intimidating and even imprisoning those
who disagreed with their policies. Moreover, the initially peaceful protest
movement was marred by tensions and clashes amongst the regime’s
opponents. Whether or not the national dialogue, with its emphasis on
reconciliation, will be able to deflect such tensions is for the future to tell.
Postscript
After several months of political stalemate, on 19 December 2012, Pres-
ident Hadi issued a decree dealing with the restructuring of the army,
thus starting to implement one of the principal points of the transi-
tion agreement. With the restructuring of the security forces still out-
standing, the elite Republican Guard and the First Armoured Division
have been amalgamated with the Strategic Reserve Force, one of the five
newly established military branches. The Republican Guard is now under
President Hadi’s control and its former commander, Saleh’s son Ahmad,
will take up an ambassadorship in the UAE. General ‘Ali Muhsin has
been appointed presidential advisor on security affairs.
The National Dialogue Conference (NDC) began on 18 March 2013,
the anniversary of the ‘Friday of Dignity’. It includes 565 delegates from
across Yemen’s political and social spectrum, among them members of
new political movements and historically marginalised groups. Women
constitute 30 per cent of the representative body. The dialogue is wider
in scope than those conducted in Bahrain in 2011 and 2013, and pro-
motes discussion of issues of substance rather than their agendas. By mid-
2013 it was expected that an agreement regarding the introduction of a
federal system would soon be reached (few, among them Islah, have not
endorsed it). Nine separate committees, some led by women, have been
discussing specific issues. By June 2013, they had visited 18 governorates
in an attempt to reach out to non-delegates, and made more than 100 rec-
ommendations to the Plenary. A newly created ND Consensus Committee
is to reconcile those recommendations and to aid reaching consensus.
The issue of the South remains the most contentious one. In his speech
to the UN Security Council on 11 June 2013, Jamal Benomar noted that
without a consensual settlement of the ‘Southern question’ the founda-
tions of a new constitution could not be developed. Several representa-
tives of southern political groups are taking part in the NDC, among
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them Lutfi Shatarah and Muhammad ‘Ali Ahmad, but many remain out-
side. A significant number of recommendations (“twenty points”) made
to President Hadi by the ND’s Technical Committee address grievances
and human rights violations in the South. According to a new presiden-
tial decree, issued in January 2013, two committees composed of lawyers
and military personnel are to solve outstanding issues such as land appro-
priation in the South since the war of 1994. Proposals on the status of
the South are likely to be debated within the context of discussion of a
new system of governance. The UN envoy also noted that the Yemeni
government has yet to establish a Commission of Inquiry into the events
of 2011 or to adopt a law on transitional justice.
Critics (among them independent youth) dispute that a new inclusive
politics is emerging, and object to what they consider interference in local
decisions by foreign bodies. They argue that participants’ daily stipends
of around $100 alienate them from the rest of the population (40 per cent
live on less than $2 a day). Against the background of the threat of UN
sanctions, key players or their representatives at the NDC may hesitate
risking their fortunes by seeking to undermine the transition process.
Despite some Yemenis’ reservations, for the time being the NDC would
seem the only workable mechanism for resolving differences peacefully.
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